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For a perfect faith would soon bring with it a perfect contempt
and scorn for this present life. If we could grasp and believe for
a certainty that God is our Father and that we are his [children]
and heirs, the world would immediately seem vile to us, with every
thing that it regards as precious, such as righteousness, wisdom,
kingdoms, power, crowns, gold, glory, riches, pleasure, and the like.
We would not be so concerned about food. We would not attach our
hearts so firmly to physical things that their presence would give
us confidence and their removal would produce dejection and even
despair. But we would do everything with complete love, humility,
and patience.^
Although Luther could not always grasp the cultural aijd
social implications of justification by grace through faithTTi^
did have moments when the utter radicality ot his thought
broke through. The quotation above from his commentary on
Galatians 4: Vis one of those moments. Certainly these words
could be interpreted as the hanging on of monastic piety or of
an overactive Neo-Platonism, but they also say that the person
who is justified and believes that fully is free from the religion
and ideology of his/her culture. ‘T^erfect faith” brings with it
a new worldview.
This is an insight that Lutherans have not taken very seri-
ously. Many of us have spent much energy “within the camp”
in recent years bringing about the creation of the Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church in Canada and the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America, yet one wonders whether we are perhaps
merely rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Will all
the emotional, physical, and material energy expended on our
internal concerns actually lead us somewhere, or has it just
been something to keep us busy while the uniquely Lutheran
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witness to the Gospel beeoiiies a minor footnote to the history
of mainline Christianity?
There is some evidence which could be used to support a
pessimistic reading of the past few years. Since the 1940s, as
mah}TlA^ have come' out' orfE^ ethnic isolation into
the Canadian and American mainstreams, we have not signif-
icantly influenced those mainstreams by our presence. Rather
we have taken on more and more characteristics of the Angli-
cans or Reformed who were there before us. Our movement
into the mainstream of North American life has diminished
our confldence and sense of identity as we assumed that the
ticket to respectability lay in making ourselves look like the
already-respectable.
This may not even be a development to be bemoaned. Has
the presence of Lutherans in North American life made any dif-
ference beyond German beerfests in Ontario and Danish tourist
traps in California? One would be hard-pressed to And specific
points where the uniquel^TLu^^^ the Gospel has
Had ^y im^ct at all . Given'^o^ recon in Canada and the
United States, one might ask whether it is even meaningful to
speak of a "uniquely Lutheran witness to the Gospel”.




we have deflned the GospeL^ uncon3^^^
iTelTJi^tiflc^tl^ sola gr^ia^ 5 /g mid Lo
IpUTEe heart and core of ChristT^ity. the doctrine on which tl^e
riven our small impact on our North
American culture we need to ask whether we are really serious
about the doctrine of justification . If we are serious, how can
that seriousness show itself in the lives of people and in society?
One of our problems is that we have not followed up on the
possibility that the doctrine of justification Inight set us free
froTuTthe reTigioiTanTideolngy^o^ tfirough
a simplistic use ofthe^^Doctnne^^ and
tEaU it doSnot threaten ideology . In the North American
context this means that we have told ourselves that the ideol-
and the doctrine of justification can live
e Lutherans presenFoiifselves asquite nicely side-by-side ^
no threat to the cultural and ideological status quo. Some of
us even establish institutes to provide a religious support to
the dominant ideology and its religious expression.
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If the fundamental teaching of Lutheranism is that our re.-
lationship with God is based on unconditional promise
thab meaning in life is given sola gratia^ sofa^fid^ solus
Christus^ then weare lying to our societyabout being non-
threatening. If we really want to support the ideological status
quo, then vie should stop harping about sola gratia and sola
fide and especially solus Christus and join the mainstream of
North American cultural religion.
This is an unusual challenge for a Lutheran to issue to other
Lutherans but it is a challenge that has some basis in the way
that worldviews and ideologies operate in human societies. The
point to be considered is whether one can alter a people’s fun-
damental understanding of their relationship with God without
also altering their fundamental understanding of their relation-
ships to one another in society. If we have left our ideology or
worldview intact, do we really believe that we are just ified by
faith alone without works of law?
One way to examine this question is through the concepts of
“paradigm”, “ideology”, and "worldview". Thomas S. Kuhn
has popularized use of “paradigm" in analyzing the history
of scientific progress.- Kuhn defines paradigms as "univer-
sally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide
model problems and solutions to a conmiimity of practition-
ers”, or as “one or more past scientific achievements... that
some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time
as supplying the foundation for its future practice." ^ Kuhn
maintains that the advance of science consists of a series of
paradigm shifts. Scientific "progress" occurs when anomalies
build up, creating pressure for the old paradigm, until someone
imagines a new paradigm. Once the new paradigm is accepted,
then research proceeds along the new paths.
Ian Barbour has adapted Kuhn's ideas to the study of re-
ligion and the relation of religion to science. Barbour de-
fines a paradigm as “a tradition transmitted through histor-
ical exemplars”."^ Barbour has also shown how the concept of
paradigm can help understand the nature of religion and reveal
similarities between religion and science.
While Barbour does not specifically examine the relation-
ship between paradigm shifts in science and reformation in
theology, it would seem safe to assume that the two operate
somewhat similarly. That would mean that Luther's propo^
56 Consensus
of justification sola gratia, sola fide can be understood as a
paradigm shift. The Reformation did have results similar to
a paradigm shift in science in that a new tradition with new
“exemplars” through which people learned the faith and new
problems for theologians to research came into being.
One weakness in the analysis of Kuhn and Barbour is that
neither science nor religion is placed within its full social and
cultural context. We can move in that direction through the
concept of “ideology”. This concept began with the French
revolutionary thinker Destutt de Tracy, who traced his roots
from Bacon, Locke, and Helvetius through Condiallac. Accord-
ing to de Tracy, ideology was the science which demonstrated
the “relationship between experience and ideas and the rela-
tionship between truth and a well ordered world.” 5 It was his
hope that ideology would replace the dogmas of the church in
French life. De Tracy assumed that the change in social real-
ity brought about by the French Revolution made possible a
change in the basic “dogmas” of the society and that such a
chan^was necessary to protect and suppol^t the advances of
The person who is most influential in the modern approach
to the concept of ideology is Rarl Marx In Marx’s opinion,
HegeTand even the “Left” Hegelians such as Feuerbach did not
see the real connection between thought and actual social con-
ditions. This led Marx to develop an understanding of ideology
as part of his attempt to understand the relationship "between
distorted consciousness and economic conditions. According
to"Marx7 ideology is thought wtiich arises from and conceals
domination of one class by another. Thus ideology is a nega-
tive concept which describes distorted thought. Marx believed
that progress could not l^ginjwRh changing consciousness but
must begin with change of material reality . As long as contra-
dictions in social reality exist, people will project these con-
tradictions in ideology. In this case ideology is thought which
seems to solve the contradictions but, in fact, only conceals or
misrepresents them.^
According to Marx, ideology should be dealt with in two
ways: resolution and critique. Ideology is overcome only when
social contradictions are resolved and ideological thought is
no longer necessary. Riactice resolves in fact those coT)traflk>
tions which ideology seems to resolve in consciousness. Practice
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which leads to resolution would include the critique of ideology.
I'o critique ideology is to point out the contradictions inher-
ent in ideological thought and to anticipate their solution. In
order to critique ideology one must also understand the so-
cial contradictions which have given rise to itJ For Marx, the
alternative to ideological thought is scientific thought which
accurately understands society and economy.
Marx spoke of religion in much the same way:
[Humanity] is the world of [people], the state, society. This state,
this society, produce religion, a reversed world-consciousness, be-
cause they are a reversed world. Religion is the general theory of
that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in a popular
form, its spiritualistic point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral
sanction, its solemn completion, its universal ground for consola-
tion and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human
essence because the human essence has no true reality. The strug-
gle against religion is therefore mediately the fight against the other
world, of which religion is the spiritual aroma.
Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real
distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of
the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is
the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people.^
For Marx, the critique of a fundamental religious principle
would be the critique of a fundamental ideological principle.
After Marx’s death Marxists tended to lose the negative
connotations of ideology and defined it as “the totality of so-
cial consciousness” or as “the political ideas connected with
the interests of a class”. Especially in Lenin the concept loses
any negative connotations and ideology is not necessarily a
distortion of thought, but simply the political consciousness
of a particular class. Thus one can have “bourgeois” ideology
and/or “proletarian” ideology.^ The existence of these various
definitions within Marxism has led to debates and to attempts
to draw a distinction between a general concept and a partic-
ular concept of ideology.
Also infiuential in understanding the concept of ideology
is the work of Karl Mannheim in the period between the two
world wars. Mannheim’s desire is to discover reality through
the soc'iology of knowledge. He believes that understanding the
two conceptions of ''ideology” and “uto})ia” enable us to avoid
distortion of thought: "Specifically, they can be used to combat
the tendency in our intellectual life to separate thought from
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the world of reality, to conceal reality, or to exceed its limits.
Thought should contain nothing less nor more than the reality
in whose medium it operates.” ^ For Mannheim, the problem is
“false consciousness”. 12 fje attempts to deal with the problem
by tracing the historical development of the concept of ideology
and by making various distinctions brought out in the course
of such development.
The first such is the distinction between the particular and
the total conceptions of ideology. The particular use identifies
the ideas of one’s opponent as misrepresentations of reality
—
whether more or less conscious. The total conception calls the
opponent’s entire worldview into question. It is in this latter
use that we speak of the ideology of an age or of a class, “when
we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of
the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group.” 1^
The particular use of ideology always focuses on the individual
while the total use analyses the “whole outlook of a social
group” and so cannot focus on either the individual or the
collection of individuals, but must deal with the theoretical
basis upon which individual and group decisions are made.
The particular conception of ideology, according to Mann-
heim, can be traced back to Francis Bacon’s theory of the
idola—preconceptions which lead to false views of nature
while Kant and Hegel are the primary progenitors of the total ;
conception. In the twentieth century, and especially through
|
the influence of Marxism, the two conceptions have begun to i
merge.
I
Mannheim states that this gives rise to a need for another I
distinction in the total use of ideology which will help under-
|
standing. In the past one tended to apply the total conception
|
to one’s opponents. This is the special formulation of the total
|
conception. Historical development has now led to a new mode
j
of understanding in which some have been willing to apply the
|
total conception also to their own thought, so that all points I




With the general form of the total conception, the concept
|
of ideology, says Mannheim, has now acquired a new mean-
j
ing. Ideological analysis is now directed toward showing the
j
relationship of every intellectual position held with its social i
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situation. Now thought is seen as fully connected to the so-
cial process. Mannheim holds that, in this situation, one needs
to recognize not relativism, but relationism; “Relationism sig-
nifies merely that all of the elements of meaning in a given
situation have reference to one another and derive their signif-
icance from this reciprocal interrelationship in a given frame
of thought.”!^
Mannheim assumes that “there are spheres of thought in
which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing
independently of the values and positions of the subject and
unrelated to social context.” That is, one cannot contain his-
torical truth in formulae like unto basic arithmetic statements.
The conceptualstructuPes”^^ to understand history
and socieiy thdmserveslhisdThrtnstor^^ This leads
idamiheir^^ whatTie calls^ tfieTistmction between the non-
evaluative general total conception of ideology and the evalu-
ative general total conception.
The non-evaluative approach to ideological analysis does
not attempt to determine the correctness of the ideas studied
but only analyzes the connection of thought structure and so-
cial/historical context. The goal of such inquiry is to show
how, in certain historical periods, intellectual systems were
connected to life experience and to trace the interaction be-
tween system and experience.
In Mannheim’s view use of this non-evaluative approach it-
self leads to the recognition that the historian cannot truly be
non-evaluative, for this approach to ideological analysis itself
questions the truth of other approacEeh^to^Isbory^
any appmach wTmE^^archd^ The s^rch for
absolutes is rev^aleads^anTdeoI^^ of the status quo.
The non-evaluative approach gives birth to the evaluative ap-
proach as the researcher realizes that even empirical procedures
are based on meta-empirical judgments which are metaphysical
and ontological. With this development the problem of false
consciousness is put on a new level: “The danger of ‘false con-
sciousness’ nowadays is not that it cannot grasp an absolute
unchanging reality, but rather that it obstructs comprehension
of a reality which is the outcome of constant reorganization of
the mental processes which make up our worlds.”
of the intellectual in the present is to determine which among
the current ideas are valid in the current situation.
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In this context, ideology is defined as forms of thought
which are no longer adequate for comprehending present real-
ity or as forms of thought which try to resolve problems using
absolutes which people cannot live by in the present situation.
Mannheim says that “knowledge is distorted and ideological
when it fails to take account of the new realities applying to a
situation, and when it attempts to conceal them by thinking
of them in categories which are inappropriate.”
Mannheim believes that forms of thought can fail to cor-
respond to reality both by falling behind and by anticipating
reality. This premise leads to the distinction of ideology and
utopia. Every socio-economic system is attached to ideas which
are “unreal” in that situation. That is, there are ideas which
cannot be actualized within the given system. These ideas and
thought systems are ideologies, according to Mannheim, when
their goals are not realized and they cannot be put into practice
without distorting their meaning. Utopias also orient conduct
to ideals which cannot be realized in the current situation, but
by their presence succeed in changing the situation. Utopias
transform historical reality in the direction of their own con-
ceptions.
Since Mannheim the discussion of the concept of ideology
has evidenced a great deal of disagreement not only over the
precise meaning of the concept, but also over whether the con-
cept has any meaning at all in its current uses. The Marx-
ists have generally been involved in discussion of the question
whether ideology is always negative in Marx’s sense or whether
ideology is essentially a neutral term in Lenin’s sense. Non-
Marxist political scientists have also debated this question and
the question whether “ideology” is a meaningful concept for
empirical analysis of politics.
An illustration of a neutral definition of ideology is Patrick
Corbett in his work Ideologies Recognizing that the word
has been used to refer to a multiplicity of phenomena, Corbett
suggests six stipulations for usage: First, there is no negative
connotation. The use of “ideology” does not imply goodness
or badness, rationality or irrationality. Second, the use of the
term imposes no limits on the contents, so ideologies might
be, for example, moral, political, religious, economic, or some
combination. Third, the system of beliefs referred to should
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imply a way of life so that commitment to the system of be-
liefs is also commitment to particular actions. Fourth, some
part of the system designated by the term will involve basic
assumptions about humanity and the universe. Fifth, the be-
liefs form a system. Sixth, the belief system is associated with
a particular social group and holding the system is necessary
for membership in the group.
The definition which Corbett derives from these specifica-
tions is:
By ‘ideology’, therefore, is meant here any intellectual structure
consisting of; a set of beliefs about the conduct of life and the or-
ganisation of society; a set of beliefs about [human] nature and the
world in which [we live]; a claim that the two sets are interdepen-
dent; and a demand that those beliefs should be professed, and that
claim conceded, by anyone who is to be considered a full member
of a certain social group.
We see here a definition of ideology at some variance with
Mannheim’s, specifically in that Corbett does not link ideol-
ogy with “false consciousness”. Indeed, some scholars have
attempted specifically to counter the definitions of Marx and
Mannheim which both assume “ideology” to be thought which
distorts reality. One such is M. Seliger,22 argues against
the “restrictive conception” and in favor of an “inclusive con-
ception”. Seliger’s inclusive conception is:
An ideology is a group of beliefs and disbeliefs (rejections) expressed
in value sentences, appeal sentences and explanatory statements.
These sentences refer to moral and technical norms and are related
to descriptive and analytical statements of fact with which they are
arranged and together interpreted as a doctrine bearing the imprint
of the centrality of morally founded prescriptions. A doctrine, which
is to say an ideology, presents a not entirely self-consistent, not
fully verified and verifiable, but not merely distorted body of views.
These views relate in the main to forms of human relationships
cind socio-political organization as they should and could be and
refer from this perspective to the existing order and vice versa.
Ideologies share with others some morally and factually based views
and thus attest ideological pluralism without thereby losing their
distinctiveness.
According to Seliger it is impossible to separate politics
from ideology because ideology directs its belief system toward
justifying moral norms and explaining the facts in such a way
that either change or preservation of the social order can be
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implemented. Ideology is different from political philosophy in
that ideology is action-oriented. Because the action-orientation
demands a programme of action, ideologies tend to bifurcate
into dogmatic dimensions, which are more doctrinally pure,
and operative dimensions, which are more pragmatic.
One of the more recent theorists of ideology is John Thomp-
son, who is attempting to bring together the study of ideol-
ogy with the study of language, based in part on the work
of Jurgen Habermas. For Thompson, ideological analysis then
becomes the study of the intersection of language and power. 24
He argues that the best understanding of ideology is a refor-
mulated critical conception which links ideology “to the pro-
cess of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power—that is, to
the process of maintaining domination.” Thus, to study ideol-
ogy is to study how language and ideas are used to maintain
domination. 25
In Thompson’s opinion ideology is not “a sort of social ce-
ment, binding the members of a society together by providing
them with collectively shared values and norms.” He argues
that modern industrial societies are not marked by beliefs held
in common, but by a diversity of values and beliefs. Because
of that ideology involves “the complex ways in which meaning
is mobilized for the maintenance of relations of domination”
rather than a set of commonly held values. 26
Thompson also holds that ideology is not pure illus^n,
not purely a distortion of reaht3^B^cause^deorog operates
tErough language and language is"a means of action, ideology is
itself one of the factors that constitutes social reality. “Ideology
is not a pale image of the social world but is part of that world,
a creative and constitutive part of our social lives.” 27 In this
sense ideology is a use of the social imagination to create and
represent systems of relationship. Says Thompson, “To study
ideology is to study, in part, the ways in which these creative,
imaginary activities serve to sustain social relations which are
asymmetrical with regard to the organization of power.” 28
How can the concept of ideology and its use by social and
political thinkers help us take the doctrine of justification se-
riously? In the first place, it seems to be generally agreed by
all of those surveyed that ideas have social and political im-
plications and that social, economic, and political conditions
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are reflected in consciousness. If that is the case, then a fun-
damental doctrine such as justification will have implicationstii^
^
for a person’s life in society. This is especially true if we adopt
^ ^
something like Thompson’s definition of ideology as an imagi-
.-p ^
native linguistic construction of social relationship^ ^ ^
trine of justiticatlon puts Torward^-^w of the world in which "5 ^
a person's or a people's wortlTis dependent solely^
iherited favour
,
not on their own achievements. This creates a
representation ofliuman relationships whKTTcalls into"^^
any domination based on perceived:Te^Qrman^
The question, theni~is wlie^nF^fheTtoHnhF'^^^ustification
supports or cdtiques the id^logy of the North American^ c^^
sunier/industrial societies. If Luther realized that the doctrine
was at odds with the ideology of sixteenth century Germany,
he chose to support that ideology in social life even as he at-
tacked it m ecclesiastical life. What is the ideol^ical situation
in Panada and the United States today? Does thelCTea^at
^d affirms and accepts people withoiit^ny regard^ToF t^
performance support or undermine that ideology
?~'™~^"^
Ideologies always operate within a broader cultural frame-
work, a framework which can perhaps be understood through
the concept of worldview as used by cultural anthropologists.
For the purposes of this essay we will review the definition of
worldview as presented by various introductory texts in the
discipline. In each of these the concept is considered basic to
the understanding of the workings of culture and the effects of
culture on attitude and behaviour.
John Friedl discusses worldview in his chapter on socializa-
tion. It is through socialization that children learn the world-
view of a culture and the rules of behaviour that are based
on that worldview. The worldview “includes the values and
morals, attitudes and beliefs, and everything about the out-
look on life, from how a person relates to his [sic] fellow human
beings to how he relates to the universe.” 29 Elsewhere Friedl
defines worldview as “the basic outlook (relationship to nature,
the native’s point of view, values, attitudes, morals, beliefs)
held in common by most members of a society.” ^9
Paul Hiebert relates worldview to a culture’s models of real-
ity and models for action. Worldview includes both postulates
which explain the nature of the universe and human life, and
values and norms which teach people right and wrong. Some
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of these worldview assumptions are explicit in the stories and
beliefs of the people and others are implicit. Worldview is the
total set of beliefs, values, norms, and assumptions which en-
able people to make sense of their experience in the world. 31
The basic assumptions provided by the worldview are given
specific content in religion. Hiebert defines religion as encom-
passing “all specific beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality
and the origins, meaning, and destiny of life, as well as the
myths and rituals that symbolically express them.” 32
Emily Schultz and Robert Lavenda define worldview as
“encompassing pictures of reality created by the members of
cultures.” 33 Worldview is a product of the human attempt to
make sense of the world in a comprehensive way. This results in
a “shared framework of assumptions about the way the world
works.” 34
Schultz and Lavenda argue that metaphor plays an impor-
tant role in the construction of a worldview:
World view aims to encompass the widest possible understanding of
the way the world works. In constructing world views, people tend
to examine what they already know well for clues that might help
them make sense of what puzzles them. The power of metaphor
to bring insight into areas of human experience that are vague or
poorly understood constitutes its chief value as a tool for construct-
ing world views.3^
Worldviews vary from culture to culture. It also occurs
that there are competing worldviews within a particular cul-
ture. How does a society determine which is its “official” world-
view? Schultz and Lavenda give two criteria. First, the world-
view “must be able, however minimally, to make sense of, to
explain, people’s experiences in the society in question.” 36 Yet
it often happens that the official worldview is less successful at
explaining reality than one or more competitors. That is be-
cause of the second criterion: power. “People in power get to
impose their metaphors.” 37 It is possible for the less powerful
to hold their own metaphors that express their unique experi-
ence and/or provide a means for transforming the situation.
Religion is an important aspect of worldview. In fact,
Schultz and Lavenda r3erT;o religion as a version of world-
view. The definition of religion which they offer is drawn from
Clifford Geertz:
A religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish pow-
erful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in [people]
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by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
(4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.
Religion, then, is concerned with enabling people to relate.
whattEey think is to \^^t tKey think ought be .^^ Religious
rituals are experiences which make the worlHview plausible as
“the world as it is and the world as it ought to be fuse and be-
come a single world.” Rituals are actions which make sense
only if the participants’ worldview is a correct representation
of reality. They assure the participants that living in harmony
with the worldview is living in harmony with reality. Thus, re-
ligion enables the society to translate the worldview into ritual,
moral action, and social organization.
What can be concluded from this brief survey of worldview
and the expression of worldview in religion is that a fundamen-
tal change in the premises of religion will either cause or reflect
a fundamental change in worldview. That is why, for example,
Philip Watson spoke of “Luther’s Copernican Revolution”
because Luther was proposing a radical new departure for reli-
gion m the same way that Copernicus proposedT a raRi^l new_
departure for astronomy. Has Luther’s radical new departure
now become so much a part of our culture that the doctrine
of justification no longer poses the possibility of a worldview
change?
We should face the possibility that while Lutherans have
called the doctrine of justification the doctrine on which the
church stands or falls, we have not ourselves actually^Taken
the doctrine seriously . While we have on occasion taken™M
adapted form of the doctrine as a pattern for theology, we have
certainly not allowed the doctrine to be a critique of social ide-
ologies, nor hav^ we ever used it as an overarching metaphor
for an alternative worldview , in fact, one could even trace tire
history of Lutheran attempts to domesticate the doctrine by
accommodating it to the prevailing worldviews beginning with
the attempts of Melanchthon to adapt the doctrine to human-
ism and the Lutheran Scholastics to adapt it to Aristotelian
rationalism.
We say that we believe in justification sola gratia, sola fide,
solus Christus^ but we act as if we believe, like everyone else ij i
N(^th America, that^Le ground of our ])eing is in performance.
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achievement, and positive thinking . We need to face the pos-
slbilit^rTharthe ideology/religion of our society is built on a
completely different, if not fundamentally opposed, metaphor
to that expressed in the Lutheran doctrine of justification.
The North American myth is embodied in the novels of Ho-
ratio Alpjer or in the popular versions juf the l^s of famous
presidents and front ier heroes . The poor boy starts at the
bottom, works hard, thinks positively, and rises to the top.
The system provides him with a context for maximum pos-
sible personal achievement. He is rewarded for performance.
Those who do not work hard or think positively drift toward
the bottom where they receive what they deserve.
The assumption at the root of the worldview and religion
of our culture is that the universe offers the context for un-
limited human aspiration and that any goal can be achieved
through hard work and positive thinking. We can be anything
we make of ourselves. Through the ideological use of the me-
dia we are taught that those who succeed deserve to succeed;
those who fail deserve to fail. Any who doubt that this view is
fundamental to the ideology and worldview of Canadian and
American cultures should consult transcripts of the speeches
of the victors in any recent elections in the two countries.
The basic story of justification is exactly the opposite. The
poor boy starts with every possibility. He has aToving mother
,
& hard^^rkingamT m^s fatEefT^linH^ But^it
takes him until thirty even to figure out what he will do with
twelve fumble-bums as followers. His activities alienatp him
^ w religious people and end with his arrest, trial .
anTexecj^Tbnr'ThSaSs^ up with some
i^^^bisr5IFstor}rto"e^^^
d'h^ibry\)f J esusTs notThe kind of story that will fuel the
engineTb^Teconomic gr^^ inspire youn^people to givejhe
bT^ yeSs^TtEeiFl^^ to the pur^suit of income and consumer
oods. It is the kind of story that might cause people to sellg a i IS n
alnEaFfEev^ >oor, and begin^Tifemvdnch
tney are a drag on economic growthTH"*^ take seriou^
faHThatJe^ ona cross anTtEat God justifies us without
g^~1FeI&e^eTbTff^ or ^cEIevement or perfomiance or e^n
the most subversivepositive thinking,
peopIeTnT^OTth AmeTicaTWe ^^^1 be telling people exactly the
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opposite of what our society needs them to hear in order to
survive in its present form. We will set people free from the
ideological power of the consumer society.
Atthjs point it may be possible to correct our way of dis-
tinguisSiTg ‘‘two kingdom?\TnT^pasrTuSeranFhaA^^
u^eJthis distinction aFardoctrmem order to protect the social,
politicaT, and the econbrmc~staIus quo from the critique of the
doctrin^ of ju^iScation. rhe"Tesult haj^bheeiT^thar Lu^^
of^nTeach justificatlon"briiclan^"b^ seldoni live as if justified^
sola gratia, sola fide.
TTnew way toTcbnceptualize the “two kingdoms” can be seen
in the argument in the opening section of Juan Luis Segundo’s
Faith and Ideologies. Segundo posits five basic facts: (T) “Fren-
dom is gradually and steadily lost as we use it” to choose one
satisfaction"over another. (^) It is impossibTe~lSre^h human
bein^ to ^expIore“°’^^e^ limits ^ human possi5nEie?^^"dire^lv.
rSl Since we cannot compare satisfactions based o^n^'our pwn
e:?^rien^, experienceTiaFT"soaal str^^ “We musT^-
cept data given^ us" by other persons, and [they] must be
believed in.^’’ This type of knowledge Segundo labels faith; it is
this sort of faith on which we base the fundamental values and
meanings of our lives. (4) When we begin to put our values
into action we discover the “oBjectTv^tructure of reality” . We
must'd^al with the problem of the mo^ etticaciaus method for
translating our values into action. (5) “Meaning and efficacy
are two different hut complementary human dimensions
IF^^undo s disHnHion of meaning and method is correct,
then there is still a role for the distinction of two kingdoms.
What the distinction reminds us is that the methods we have at
our disposal to translate the doctrine of justification into action
in personal lives and in the structurS oT society are methods,
which come to us from the culture and ar^alreaZyiufluenced.
by the worldview, religion, and ideology^ the culture.
lOslioFthat weTlfstinguish two king3orh? in order to leave
lives and society intact as they are, but that we-^ distinguish
justificationMtgel^^ the methods available to practke tlie
linplm^i^s of jusHEcatnniTWVe do not distinguish two king-
'Hbrns because 5^IaT™^rathrpiso/a /ide, and solus Christus have
no political and economic implications, but because we rec-
ognize that the methods we have at hand to draw out those
implications are not derived from these Christian basics. \\e
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ought not distinguish the “spiritual” and the “secular”, but
we must distinguish grace and faith from the methods used to
embody grace and faith in society. The point of distinction is
that methods and techniques remain such and are not allowed
to usurp the place of fundamental meaning.
If this is correct, then we can state the distinction as follows:
It is in tJie realm of meaning and value that the doctrine of jus-
tification makes its radical impact and reigns supreme^Here
^E^e isjGospel meth^s"^jH tprjimciues
we have also to do withJJie “Law”, that is, with the struc-
ilture.tur^ Sd~ bf^^ our_
will always remain ambiguous.
These structures and orders
Here is the mistake of those
who think to withdraw from society—they think that they can
practice the Gospel apart from cultural structures—and those
who mix the “two kingdoms”—they allow method to change
meaning. Our problem as Lutherans is that we have actually
been mixing the realm of meaning and the realm of method
and allowing the methods of our culture to determine the real
meaning of our doctrine.
The task before us, if we intend to take the-doctprip nf jnsti-
fication seriously, is to develop a model which enables the rad-
ical grace of God to impact our social ethics without allowing
cation . Perh^s”weTouI3Tlegin ^ developing the utopian—in
Karl Mannheim’s sense
—
potential of the doctrine. That is, the
doctrine of justification makes statements about the fundamen-
tal nature of God which cannot be translated into consistent
action in the present social situation. One cannot function ire
the present North American capitalist economy on the basis of
unconditional affimaHKn ^f^vSu^^ this“situ^ion the d^^
tnhd~of°3ustTficatio^^^^E"^^ of the^possible . The
qu^tipn Is wEeLE^wepropose^TEis radlc^^ of
reality in order to maintain the status quo or to transform the
status^uq^
/an the doctrine of justification form the basis for the cri-
tique of current social ideologies while at the same time forming




shouldr^^n now to develop that critique and that worldview.
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